

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W

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O P 211855Z MAY 76

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 13057

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DEPARTMENT PASS ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, NAC

SUBJ: NATO MINISTERIAL: CONCLUDING SESSION, MAY 21, 1976

1. SUMMARY: RESTRICTED SESSION OF NAC MINISTERIAL CONCLUDED MORNING OF MAY 21 WITH SUMMING UP BY SYG LUNS, WHO NOTED BROAD AGREEMENT AMONG THE MINISTERS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE SITUATION IN AFRICA. PLENARY SESSION NOTED REPORTS ON CSCE, MBFR, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY. END SUMMARY

2. RUMOR (ITALY) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND DESCRIBED IT AS AN AREA OF ALMOST ENDEMIC CONFLICT WHERE IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. TURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, RUMOR TERMED THE SECOND SINAI AGREEMENT A POSITIVE EVENT AND HOPED FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE BECAUSE OTHERWISE THE SITUATION WILL BECOME WORSE. THE ALLIES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PALESTINIANS, WHO MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. RUMOR EXPRESSED ENCOURAGEMENT AT CAIRO'S CURRENT ATTITUDE AS EXPRESSED BY SADAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO ROME. RUMOR SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT WITHIN ISRAEL

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SOME ELEMENTS ARE TAKING A RIGID POSITION REGARDING

FURTHER STEPS IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE OTHERS PREFER A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TOWARD THE ARABS. IN HIS OWN VIEW, FURTHER STEPS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. PARTICULARLY WORISOME ARE THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE REGION. REFERRING TO THE EXPECTED ARRIVAL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN OF TWO SOVIET HELICOPTER CARRIERS, RUMOR SAID THERE MUST BE NO DETERIORATION IN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE AREA. IN THIS REGARD, THE CONTINUED US PRESENCE IS VERY IMPORTANT, BUT THERE

ARE ELEMENTS OF DOUBT ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE. RUMOR SAID SEVERAL ALLIES HAVE ACCEPTED THE FINANCIAL BURDEN REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A WESTERN PRESENCE ON MALTA. THE CURRENT AGREEMENT WILL EXPIRE AND IF A SOLUTION IS NOT FOUND, THE RESULTS WILL BE NEGATIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION, ITALY HOPES THAT PLANNING WILL BEGIN FOR A CONCRETE SOLUTION ON THE MALTA PROBLEM.

3. FRYDENLUND (NORWAY) OBSERVED THAT THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES SHOULD SEEK TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE BELIEVED IT A MISTAKE TO REFUSE TO DIFFERENT AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AS EITHER COMMUNIST OR NON-COMMUNIST. IN FRYDENLUND'S VIEW, THEY ARE ALL NATIONALISTS AND THEIR LINKS WITH THE USSR OR PRC ARE THE RESULT OF THEIR NEED FOR MILITARY HELP. FRYDENLUND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE AVOIDING ANY CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. REGARDING ANOLA, HE URGED THE ALLIES TO BEGIN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT. TURNING TO RHODESIA, HE SAID THE AFRICANS BELIEVE RHODESIA CAN BE LIBERATED BY FORCE AND THIS COULD LEAD TO A NEW EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

4. MACEACHEN (CANADA) REGRETTED THE UNJUSTIFIED ACCUSATIONS THAT CONTINUE TO BE MADE ALLEGING NATO SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA. HE THOUGHT IT DOUBTFUL THAT RHODESIA, OR EVEN SOUTH AFRICA, CAN MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE ALLIES MUST BE CAREFUL TO

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AVOID EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF SUPPORTING THE WHITE MINORITY REGIMES. SUCH AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION, HE THOUGHT, COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ALLIES' RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. IN PARTICULAR, NATO MUST COUNTER ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT IS COOPERATING WITH SOUTH AFRICA, FOR EVEN THE MOST INNOCENT ACTIVITIES CAN BE MISINTERPRETED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE NAC

KEEP THIS MATTER UNDER CLOSE WATCH AND THAT ALLIED DELEGATIONS AT THE UN CONSULT MORE CLOSELY. IN ADDITION, MACEACHEN SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES CONSIDER ISSUING A COMMON STATEMENT EXPRESSING THEIR OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S RACIAL POLICY. MACEACHEN WAS STRUCK BY THE EMPHASIS PLACED BY OTHER SPEAKERS ON THE NEED FOR A COHERENT POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT AID, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA. THE CURRENT UNCTAD MEETING PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION. THE MID-JUNE AND JULY MEETINGS OF THE CIEC WILL FURNISH FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES, WHICH HE HOPED WLL HAVE POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. MACEACHEN SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND.

5. RECALLING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THE TERMINATION OF ITS NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAM WITH INDIA, MACEACHEN EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE COVERED ALL THE REACTORS IN INDIA. FOR THIS REASON, OTTAWA HAD DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE PROGRAM ENTIRELY AND CANADA HAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A POLICY OF TERMINATING ALL NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS WITH STATES WHICH EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE USING CANADIAN SOURCES OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY. THE INDIAN CASE HAS REINFORCED OTTAWA'S VIEW THAT THE ONLY WAY TO LIMIT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION I THROUGH THE FULL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. WHILE NOT ASKING THAT OTHER ALLIES FOLLOW CANADA'S EXAMPLE IN TERMINATING EXISTING AGREEMENTS, OTTAWA DOES ASK THAT INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS BE OBSERVED. MACEACHEN SAID HE ALSO WISHED TO CLARIFY THE QUESTION OF CANADIAN INTENTIONS TO PURCHASE LONG-RANGE PATROL AIRCRAFT. IT HAD PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO PROCEED WITH THE PLANNED

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ACQUISITION OF 18 SUCH AIRCRAFT FROM LOCKHEED, BUT THIS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS ONLY A TEMPORARY SETBACK WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S BASIC PROGRAM. NOR DOES CANADA INTEND TO CHANGE ITS MARITIME DEFENSE ROLE AND OTTAWA WILL PROCEED TO SELECT ANOTHER AIRCRAFT. UNTIL THE NEW AIRCRAFT ARE IN SERVICE, THE CURRENT ARGUS AIRCRAFT WILL REMAIN IN OPERATION. MACEACHEN SAID THAT HE NEVERTHELESS WISHED TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO SECRETARY KISSINGE FOR HIS EFFORTS IN RYING TO PERMIT THE LOCKHEED PURCHASE TO PROCEED. IN ANOTHR AREA, MACEACHEN AFFIRMED CANADA'S INTENTION TO RE-EQUIP ITS FORCES IN EUROPE WITH NEW BATTLE TANKS AND SAID THIS WOULD BE DONE THROUGH THE PURCHASE OF LEOPARD I.

6. SYG LUNS INTERVENED TO COMMENT ON WHAT PREVIOUS SPEAKERS HAD SAID ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA. HE SAID HE COULD ASSURE THE COUNCIL THAT NATO WAS TAKING THE GREATEST CARE TO DO NOTHING THAT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA. AS PART OF HIS OWN EFFORT TO EXPLAIN NATO'S POLICY IN THIS MATTER, HE HAD RECEIVED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UN APARTHEID COMMITTEE AND THE COMMISSION ON NAMIBIA AND HAD EXPLAINED THE SITUATION TO THE SATISFACTION OF THESE REPRESENTATIVES. IN ADDITION, AT THE REQUEST OF AFRICANS, HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ADDRESSEES.

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7. VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT THERE WERE NO LINKS WHATSOEVER BETWEEN NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE SOUTHERN AFRICA IN BECOMING INCREASINGLY AN AREA OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION. HE HAD LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO THE VIEW THAT THE EUROPEANS, WITH THEIR HISTORICAL TIES TO AFRICA, SHOULD INCREASE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THAT CONTINENT. VAN DER STOEL EXPRESSED HOPE THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AND PROMISED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ITS ALLIES ON THIS MATTER. IN VAN DER STOEL'S VIEW, THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD CONTINUE TO ESCALATE IF THE SMITH REGIME DID NOT AGREE TO MAJORITY

RULE. HE HOPED THE ALLIES WOULD MAKE SANCTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE AND WOULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RHODESIA'S BLACK AFRICAN NEIGHBORS. HE ALSO HOPED THAT PRETORIA WOULD COOPERATE IN ISOLATING THE SMITH REGIME AND WOULD, IN ADDITION, WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA. ANOTHER AREA WHICH THE ALLIES SHOULD EMPHASIZE, IN VAN DER STOEL'S VIEW, IS SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF CREATING BANTUSTANS, WHICH HE SAID ARE VIEWED BY THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS SIMPLY A NEW FORM OF APARTHEID. THIS AFRICAN VIEW, HE SAID, SHOULD DETERMINE THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BANTUSTANS. FINALLY, VAN DER STOEL EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD FULLY OBSERVE THE UN RESOLUTIONS BANNING THE EXPORT OF MILITARY SECRET

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EQUIPMENT TO SOUTH AFRICA. IF THIS WERE DONE, HE SAID, IT WOULD CREATE GREATER AFRICAN CONFIDENCE IN THE WEST AND MIGHT HELP TO LESSEN TENSIONS IN AFRICA.

8. SYG LUNS SUMMED UP THE RESTRICTED SESSION BY BRIEFLY RECALLING THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS. LUNS SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY THE LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT EXPRESSED BY THE MINISTERS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS QKD THE AFRICAN SITUATION. THE ALLIES MUST RECOGNIZE, LUNDSAID, THAT THE USSR HAS ACHIEVED THE STATUS OF A GLOBAL POWER AND THERE I LITTLE THE ALLIES CAN DO TO AFFECT THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES CAN INFLUENCE THE WAY SOVIETS USE THEIR POWER AND, IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ANSWKAREFUL TO EVALUATZTHE BALANCE OF FORCES BEFORE ACTING IN A GIVEN SITUATION. THE ALLIES MUST THEREFORE INSURE THAT THE BALANCE OF FORCES DOES NOT TILT TO THEIR DISADVANTAGE. LUNS SAID HE AGREED WITH THORN'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD STUDY THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS NEW SITUATION, AND HE ALSO AGREED WITH GENSCHER THAT, THROUGH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE EFFORTS, THE ALLIES COULD MASTER THE SITUATION. LUNS WAS STRUCK BY SAUVAGNARGUES' REMARK THAT DETENTE AND DEFENSE ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN; HE WAS ALSO IMPRESSED BY SAUVAGNARGUES' NEW PHRASE OF "CONTAINMENT BY DIALOGUE."

9. RECALLING THAT SEVERAL SPEAKERS TOUCHED ON YUGOSLAVIA, LUNS NOTED THAT BITSIOS HAD POINTED UP THE NEED TO MAKE WESTERN POLICIES REGARDING YUGOSLAVIA CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS. HE SAID RUMOR HAD PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES AND HAD TOUCHED ON THE THORNY SUBJECT OF MALTA.

10. LUNS SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT REGARDING AFRICA. SOME FOREIGN MINISTERS

HAS SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR NATO ITSELF NOT TO GET PUBLICLY INVOLVED IN AFRICAN PROBLEMS, AND TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF "PASSIVITY" REGARDING THIS AREA. LUNS SAID THIS WAS IN FACT THE NATO POSTURE.

11. MANY FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD TOUCHED ON THE NEED TO  
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INSURE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE AGREEMENTS AND FOR THE ALLIES TO BEGIN TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUES THEY WOULD FACE AT BELGRADE. SOME HAD SUGGESTED THE DESIRABILITY OF GIVING THE SOVIETS MORE TIME TO DEMONSTRATE CSCE IMPLEMENTATION; THESE SPEAKERS MENTIONED THAT THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF SOVIET OBLIGATIONS IN CSCE AND WOULD BE WATCHING THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND, A FEW SPEAKERS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ALLIES MAINTAIN A HIGH PROFILE ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET COMPLIANCE.

12. LUNS WELCOMED MELO ANTUNES AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALISTIC PORTUGAL. LUNS SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED OVER THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SOBER DISCUSSION OF DISPUTES AMONG ALLIES, WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE COUNCIL AND IN BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL TALKS. HE HOPED THE EFFORTS DISPLAYED IN THIS REGARD AT THIS MINISTERIAL WOULD PRODUCE A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. LUNS THANKED FRYDENLUND FOR THE INSIGHTS HE HAD PROVIDED REGARDING NORWAY'S RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. IN CONCLUSION, LUNS SAID THE OSLO MEETING HAD BEEN A MOST USEFUL AND STIMULATING SESSION.

13. PLENARY SESSION: CSCE, MBFR, THE MEDITERRANEAN.--  
SYG LUNS CITED BRIEFLY NATO REPORTS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION, MBFR, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND IMPLICATIONS OF REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, ALL OF WHICH WERE NOTED BY THE MINISTERS.

14. STANDARDIZATION.-- IN INTRODUCING AGENDA ITEM ON STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY, SYG LUNS REVIEWED NATO DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT TO DATE AND SUGGESTED THAT THE NATO AD HOC COMMITTEE'S REPORT TO MINISTERS BE FORWARDED ALSO TO DEFENSE MINISTERS FOR THEIR REVIEW AT THE DPC MINISTERIAL IN JUNE. SAUVAGNARGUES (FRANCE) COMPLIMENTED THE AD HOC COMMITTEE'S WORK ON THIS SUBJECT. HE NOTED THAT THE RESULTS AFTER ONLY A FEW MONTHS' WORK IN THE ALLIANCE ARE UNDERSTANDABLY MODEST, IN VIEW OF THE MANY TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, BUT THAT WORK ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE PURSUED. THE ALLIES SHOULD ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AMONG THEM, AND SHOULD SEEK SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME  
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THESE DIFFERENCES. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE SHOULD CONTINUE ITS WORK AND PREPARE A FURTHER REPORT FOR THE NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NAC. FOLLOWING SAUVAGNARGUES' INTERVENTION THE MINISTERS APPROVED LUNS' SUGGESTION TO FOREWARD THE AD OCK COMMITTEE REPORT ALSO TO THE DPC MINISTERIAL.

15. DATE AND PLACE OF NEXT MINISTERIAL.--THE MINISTERS APPROVED DECEMBER 9-10 AS DATES FOR NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NAC. THEY ALSO GAVE PROVISIONAL APPROVAL TO THE SYG'S SUGGESTED DATES FOR DECEMBER MINISTERIALS FOR THE NEXT SIX YEARS, SUBJECT TO CHANGE IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS.  
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NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ADDRESSEES.

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